Zero Evidence of a Cyber Attack — So Far: What the FAA, Microsoft, and Prior Infrastructure Incidents Still Leave Unresolved
Updated
We are still in the active aftermath, trying to make sense of the events that happened, starting with Friday’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight ground stop. The first major flight grounding since 9/11, and the details are still foggy.
U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy and Department of Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin were compelled to declare a national emergency as the incident unfolded.
Reports vacillate citing delayed and canceled flights anywhere from 20,000-50,000 combined between Friday and Saturday.
Mainstream news reports claim airlines expect full schedules by Sunday night; meanwhile, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy stated, “I think we’re going to be back up and operational as we come into the heat of travel during Thanksgiving.”
No root-cause government report exists yet for the flight stoppage, just official media talking points from press conferences and carefully-worded press releases.
Official narratives range from outdated air traffic control infrastructure, an updating error by longtime FAA contractor L3Harris Technologies, or a faulty router.
DHS Mullins added they have seen ‘zero evidence that this was a cyber-attack.’
Running alongside the FAA emergency flight stop starting just one day prior on Thursday, November 12th, was a major global Microsoft 365 outage. Microsoft 365 dominates enterprise productivity, holding 58% of the software market. About 75% of Fortune 500 companies use Microsoft 365 as a primary productivity suite.
Flights down, corporations hamstrung read together the pattern is large platforms failing from changes and maintenance faults, which is also the pattern an adversary would try to imitate or exploit. The data cannot separate the two, and without official forensic reports from either event, the public is left to guess.
Command Eleven Intelligence writes:
“The strongest pattern is not a shared attacker but shared fragility: concentrated platforms and aging systems where one change or one fault spreads widely. That pattern also makes these systems attractive targets, which is why the outside-actor question belongs in the assessment even without evidence.”
Without forensic explanations, there remains a chance that one or more of the incidents could be a cyber attack from unknown actors.
Is there evidence prior to these events?
A September Government Accountability Office report stated:
“The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has identified electromagnetic spectrum-related threats, including spoofing and jamming, to the National Airspace System (NAS) and international flight routes”
Volt Typhoon is a Chinese state-sponsored advanced persistent threat active since 2021 that stealthily infiltrates U.S. critical infrastructure (such as communications, energy, transportation, and water systems) to pre-position for potential disruptive or destructive cyberattacks.
Volt Typhoon’s documented methods and objectives create a speculative pattern match. U.S. agencies and Microsoft have long assessed that the group pre-positions inside communications and transportation systems specifically to enable disruption during a crisis, rather than pure espionage.
It has repeatedly compromised edge network gear like Cisco, Netgear, Fortinet, and similar routers and appliances. Once inside, it relies almost exclusively on living-off-the-land techniques: valid credentials and built-in administrative tools that leave little malware signature and can blend with legitimate maintenance activity.
Both outages centered on network equipment and upgrade windows that produced overloads and cascading failures in communications (Microsoft cloud services used by businesses and government) and transportation (air-traffic control systems).
That aligns with Volt Typhoon’s known focus on control-plane and edge infrastructure that can affect wide operational areas with relatively little noise.
In a speculative scenario, pre-existing access to relevant network devices could allow an actor to amplify or trigger instability during a planned upgrade in ways that appear as ordinary technical problems, consistent with the group’s emphasis on stealth and strategic disruption capability rather than loud, attributable attacks.
Currently, no public evidence supports that this occurred; the fit is pattern-based only.
Prior to Microsoft and the FAA event on November 5, CISA, the FBI, HHS, USDA, and DOT issued a joint warning of an “ongoing cyber threat” to industrial refrigeration and cold-chain monitoring systems globally.
They noted that unpatched or internet-accessible controllers in grocery and cold-storage facilities could be exploited to change temperatures, create fire hazards, or destroy inventory.
The advisory referenced the European incidents where cyber-attackers remotely took control of internet-exposed refrigeration controllers, switched units into defrost mode or raised temperatures to around 50°C. Estimates range from 250 to 700 supermarkets were affected, causing widespread food spoilage, some equipment fires, and tens of millions of euros in damage.
In August, roughly two months before the main European waves, 6 military bases experienced similar targeting of their refrigeration units. The Pentagon is treating the incidents as a suspected cyberattack.
Any other cyber anomalies that disrupt society or normal functioning must be investigated with a cyberattack lens until proven otherwise.